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The Subprime Crisis—Some Thoughts on a 
“Sustainable” and “Organic” Regulatory System 
Jerry W. Markham1 
“Credit is suspicion asleep” 
-William Gladstone2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Nation is now in the midst of one of the greatest financial crises in 
its history.  Much of the blame for this condition is being placed on the 
bursting of the residential real estate bubble, which was fueled in large part 
by the reckless expansion of subprime mortgage lending.  Those mortgages 
began defaulting in droves as the Federal Reserve Board drove up interest 
rates, causing massive losses at Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Morgan 
Stanley, Citigroup, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Countrywide Financial 
Group, American International Group and Merrill Lynch, to name a few.  
Those losses were shocking but paled in comparison to the failures of Leh-
man Brothers and Bear Stearns and the placing of Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae into conservatorship.  Massive bailout packages for the financial ser-
vice firms failed to restart lending, the country slipped into recession and 
unemployment soared.  The subprime crisis had other ripple effects. The 
Dow Jones Industrial average was down 47 percent on February 19, 2009 
from the high of 14,087 that was reached on October 1, 2007.3  This devas-
                                                    
 
1
 Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law, Miami, Florida.  
 
2
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tated retirement savings, college and other endowments, and every other 
investor in the market.  
On the other side of the equation were the subprime borrowers.  They 
too were devastated by the subprime crisis as their adjustable rate mort-
gages (which had been originally issued at low “teaser” rates) reset at unaf-
fordable levels.  Foreclosures became an epidemic in many communities 
across the country, Florida being one of the worst centers for those sad 
events. Hispanics were also a particular target for subprime lenders.  His-
panic homeownership in the United States grew by 47 percent between 
2000 and 2007, compared to an overall homeownership increase of 8 per-
cent.4  Tellingly, that growth was fueled by the fact that some 47 percent of 
mortgage loans to Hispanics were subprime and many of those loans are 
now being foreclosed.5  The African-American community has also been 
hard hit by the subprime crisis. Over one half of mortgage loans to African-




These problems have been blamed on flaws in the financial regulatory 
structure, and Congress has now begun the process of restructuring that 
regulation.7  Hopefully, but not likely, that process will include an objective 
assessment of how we came to this condition and what changes are needed 
to deal specifically with those problems.  This symposium addresses these 
issues from both the lenders’ and borrowers’ perspectives.  The FIU Law 
Review is to be commended for attacking these problems from both view-
points and for attracting such a fine group of scholars to address legal issues 
raised by this crisis.  This Introduction to the symposium will provide a 
description of the subprime mortgage market, discuss the flaws in the fi-
nancial system that led to the present crisis, and it will then add a few cau-
tionary suggestions on regulatory reform.  
II.  SUBPRIME LOANS 
There are no uniform standards for classifying a loan as subprime.  
However, a loan is generally viewed to fall into the subprime category if the 
borrower falls within one of the three following categories: (1) those with a 
poor credit history; (2) those with no credit history; and (3) borrowers who 
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have existing credit but are over extended.8  Factors considered in classify-
ing a loan as subprime include credit history, household debt-to-income 
ratio, and combined loan-to-value ratio for home equity loans and other 




Subprime lending is risky lending because of a high likelihood of de-
fault.  By definition, such borrowers are poor credit risks, necessarily result-
ing in higher interest rates and fees to cover those risks. In contrast to the 
subprime borrower classification, “prime” (A-Credit) borrowers have 
strong credit scores, allowing them to obtain the most competitive interest 
rates and mortgage terms.  
Historically, the subprime market was avoided by large commercial 
banks because of the default risk. As a result, subprime borrowers, until 
recent years, were serviced by non-conventional lenders and were often the 
targets of predatory lending practices.11 Government policy sought to 
change that market by encouraging, even forcing, conventional lenders to 
make subprime mortgage loans to the poor.  The Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act of 1975 (“HMDA”),12 for example, required banking institutions in 
metropolitan areas to disclose their mortgage loans by classification and 
geographic location.  This was an effort to expose the practice of “redlin-
ing,” in which banks concentrated their lending in wealthier neighborhoods. 
Individuals living in those mostly white neighborhoods generally had 
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Though ‘subprime’  has no universal definition, . . . industry custom regarded 660 as the prime-
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In re Countrywide Financial Corporation Securities Litigation, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1146-47, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102000 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (internal citations omitted).  FICO scores are based on re-
ports generated by the three large credit reporting groups: Equifax, Experian and TransUnion. PAUL 
MUOLO & MATHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME, HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND 
CREDIT CRISIS 41, n.5 (2008).  
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higher incomes and lower default rates than poorer neighborhoods where 
minorities were often concentrated.13  
HMDA was followed by the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) 
of 1977.14  It required banks to meet the credit needs of minorities in their 
communities.15  Banking regulators scored banks on their CRA compliance, 
ranking them from “outstanding” to “substantial non-compliance.” That 
CRA score was required to be considered by banking regulators before ap-
proving bank mergers.  Activist groups and state regulators pressed banks to 




The banks at first resisted the government-inspired effort to force them 
to make loans to subprime borrowers, especially since such borrowers 
posed large credit risks.  However, in business, a failure to grow is consid-
ered death, and the banking model for the last several years has been to 
merge as the only way of growth.  Banks desperate for mergers made 
pledges of hundreds of billions of dollars of CRA loans to regulators in 
order to assure approval of their mergers.17  The government made it easy 
for the banks to obtain loans to meet these commitments by giving CRA 
credit for purchases of subprime mortgages originated by non-bank sub-
prime lenders.18 
Merger-hungry Bank of America announced that it was making a 10-
year CRA subprime lending pledge of $750 billion when it merged with 
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 Community activist groups also demanded funding from banks as a condition for their not 
protesting their mergers. Since mergers were the principal growth mechanism for large banks, many of 
them gave into this CRA “extortion.” Senator Phil Gramm from Texas inserted a provision in the 
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act in 1999 that required reports to be filed disclosing any CRA extortion pay-
ments (12 U.S.C. §1831y) in the hope that disclosure would embarrass those groups and keep such 
demands to a minimum. However, that provision did not slow the growth of subprime lending. JERRY W. 
MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM 
553 (2005). Interestingly, efforts were made to extend the CRA to mutual funds during the Clinton 
administration. MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS, AN INSIDER’S VIEW 151-52 (2008). It 
was not clear, however, how they would invest in their communities, since their investors are usually 
nationwide. Fortunately, this proposal was not pushed through Congress, and the mutual funds were not 
forced to load up on subprime securities. Had they been required to do so, the economy surely would 
have been destroyed entirely. 
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 Address by Federal Reserve Governor Randall S. Kroszner, The Community Reinvestment Act 
and the Recent Mortgage Crisis, Before the Confronting Concentrated Poverty Policy Forum, Washing-
ton D.C., on Dec. 3, 2008, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
kroszner20081203a.htm. 
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FleetBoston Financial Corp. in 2003.19  JPMorgan Chase made a larger 
$800 billion CRA pledge when it merged with Bank One Corp. The merger 
of Citibank and the Travelers Group in 1999 resulted in a ten-year $115 
billion CRA pledge.20 Washington Mutual made a CRA pledge of $120 bil-
lion in its 1998 acquisition of HF Ahmanson & Co.21  
Both the Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations also pushed toward 
more subprime lending by two giant government sponsored enterprises 
(“GSEs”), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.22 By 2000, about 50 percent of 
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One important turning point was the year 1995. The Clinton Administration embarked on a major 
policy, the National Homeownership Strategy (which led to the creation of the National Partners in 
Homeownership), designed to increase homeownership rates by encouraging broader financing 
among other things. At the same time, the Federal Reserve issued new regulations under the 
Community Reinvestment Act that, in the words of the Federal Reserve Governor who wrote the 
regulations, set up soft quotas on lending in underserved areas. Another quasi-government agency, 
the public-private Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, also helped set the stage for higher 
leverage in the housing industry. In 1995, it adopted a model down payment program with a 5 per-
cent standard at a time. The Chairman of the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation is by tradi-
tion a Federal Reserve Governor, which effectively puts the government stamp of approval on any 
program. These relaxed standards, combined with a growing economy, allowed the underpinnings 
of the housing market to begin to erode. . . . 
 
The requirement that homebuyers make significant down payments was eliminated in the 1990's. 
The National Partners in Homeownership (NPH) urged 13 and approved increasingly larger reduc-
tions in requirements. 'The partnership should support continued federal and state funding of tar-
geted homeownership subsidies for households that would not otherwise be able to purchase 
homes. Notwithstanding the growing number of high loan-to-value mortgage products available 
today, many households, particularly low-and moderate-income families, will need subsidies to 
supplement down payment and closing funds or to reduce the monthly obligation on a home pur-
chase mortgage'. 'In 1989 only 7 percent of home mortgages were made with less than 10 percent 
down payment. By August 1994, low down payment mortgage loans had increased to 29 percent'. 
This trend continued unabated throughout the 1990's so by 1999, over 50% of mortgages had 
down payments of less than 10%. In 1976, the average down payment by first time homebuyers 
was 18%, by 1999 that down payment had fallen to 12.6%. In 1999, more than 5% of all residen-
tial mortgages had no equity or had negative home-equity. Eliminating down payment barriers has 
created a homeownership option for Americans who previously were forced to rent, due to savings 
or credit issues. Over the past decade, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have reduced required down 
payments on loans that they purchase in the secondary market. Those requirements have declined 
from 10% to 5% to 3% and in the past few months Fannie Mae announced that it would follow 
Freddie Mac's recent move into the 0% down payment mortgage market. Although they are buying 
low down payment loans, those loans must be insured with 'private mortgage insurance' (PMI). On 
homes with PMI, even the closing costs can now be borrowed through unsecured loans, gifts, or 
subsidies. This means that not only can the buyer put zero dollars down to purchase a new house 
but also that the mortgage can finance the closing costs. 
 
The Bush Administration continued the push to expand home ownership, and in 2002 President 
Bush adopted a specific goal of increasing the number of minority homeowners by 5.5 million by the 
end of the decade. The Federal Housing Agency had also lowered their standards and required only a 3 
percent down payment to receive a government-backed FHA loan, and even this could  be paid by a 
third party. As the housing sector started to pick up strength on the back of low interest rates and the 
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their portfolios were subprime products.23 That policy was carried forward 
by the Bush administration.24 The 1992 Housing bill set “targets” for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac to meet in making mortgages available to low and 
moderate income borrowers. Those targets were steadily increased, reach-
ing 42 percent of these GSEs total lending by 1997. The result was that 
subprime lending grew from about 5 percent of all residential mortgage 
loans in 1994 to almost 20 percent by 2007.25  
This figure did not provide the whole picture of the risks being in-
jected into the system. Loans rated just above subprime were classified as 
“Alt-A” loans. The borrower in an Alt-A had an above subprime FICO 
score, but there was some defect in the loan such as little or no documenta-
tion (“no-doc” or “low-doc” loans) of the borrower’s creditworthiness or 
other defects. In “stated-income loans,” borrowers were allowed to state 
their income without documentation, earning them the sobriquet of “liar 
loans.”26 By 2006, 40 percent of all new mortgage originations were either 
subprime or Alt-A.27 
III.  BEHIND THE GROWTH OF SUBPRIME LENDING 
The Federal Reserve Board has contended that the CRA did not cause 
the subprime crisis because many subprime loans did not have CRA 
credit.28  However, that claim overlooks the fact that the CRA and govern-
ment policy required and legitimatized subprime lending by institutions that 
had previously shied away from such business because of the risk it pre-
                                                    
2003 turn in the macroeconomy, the government pushed for even easier standards. On January 19, 2004, 
President Bush proposed eliminating the FHA's paltry 3 percent down payment with his ‘Zero-
Downpayment Initiative,’ which would have allowed 150,000 people in the program's first year to take 
an FHA loan with no money down. While this proposal was not enacted, the private sector had long 
been following the government's lead and, in this bull market, was determined to outdo it. Rapidly rising 
home prices would make zero down loans available on a massive scale. By 2005, a remarkable 43 
percent of all first time homeowners put zero down or took out a mortgage in excess of the value of the 
home. If home prices were rising 10 percent a year, a zero down loan would gain a 10 percent equity 
stake in just 12 months. Or so the logic went. 
 
Hearing on Regulation of the Financial Sector Before the Committee of Senate Congressional Oversight 
Panel, Jan. 14, 2009, (statement of Marc Summerlin, Managing Member and Co-Founder, Lindsey 
Group) available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/news/2901951.html. 
 
23
 The Subprime Lending Bias, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 22, 2008, at A14. 
 
24
 Howard Husock, Housing Goals We Can't Afford, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at A49.  (By 
2005, HUD required that 45 percent of all the loans bought by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac be loans to 
borrowers with low and moderate incomes. HUD required further that Fannie and Freddie buy 32 per-
cent of the loans in their portfolios from people in central cities and other underserved areas and that 22 




 REGULATION OF BANKING FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES, supra note 16, at 413. 
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 Greg Griffin, Local Lender Key in Meltdown Risky Mortgages, Aurora Loan Services’ Fall 
Contributed to Lehman's Bankruptcy, DENVER POST, Nov. 11, 2008, at A-01. 
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 Hearing on Regulation of the Financial Sector, supra note 22.  
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 Address by Federal Reserve Governor Randall S. Kroszner, supra note 18. 
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sented.29 The government then opened the door, pushed the banks through 
and the banks then gorged themselves on what they believed to be a legiti-
mate, socially responsible business for which they could model and hedge 
for its inherent risk.30 Actually, the process might be better likened to sup-
plying an alcoholic with the keys to the liquor cabinet and then forcing him 
to drink as much as possible. Whatever the case, although initially forced 
into the market by the government, investment banks soon found the busi-
ness to their liking.  By 2001, as the result of the CRA and other efforts, ten 
of the twenty-five largest subprime lenders were banks or their affiliates.31  
Historically, subprime and Alt-A loans were more costly to the lender 
to originate, sell, and service than conventional prime loans.32  Neverthe-
less, subprime loans did have their attractions.  As with other mortgages, 
the lender made profits based on the spread between the funds it borrowed 
and those it lent to the subprime borrower.  Subprime interest rates had a 
spread of 300 or more basis points over conventional loans, and the high 
origination and other fees charged for subprime loans tempted lenders to 
originate large amounts of subprime loans.33 However, the default risk was 
traditionally too much for the appetite of the conventional investment 
banks.  That problem was solved through securitization, which made meet-
ing CRA pledges easy and enticed investment banks to plunge into this 
market. Once there, investment banks never looked back.  They found the 
securitization process for subprime loans to be a profitable and enticing 
business.  The investment banks then went on a binge of subprime origina-
tions and securitizations.  
In a securitization, mortgages “warehoused” (purchased) by an in-
vestment bank from mortgage originators such as non-bank lenders and 
mortgage brokers are pooled into collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) 
by a special purpose entity (“SPE”).  Ownership interests in that pool are 
then sold to investors or are used to fund asset backed commercial paper 
programs (“ABCPs”).34  This effectively sold the pooled mortgages to the 
SPE that in turn sold them to investors as a pool, generating cash for new 
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 Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan testified before Congress in October 
2008 that: “It’s instructive to go back to the early stages of the subprime market, which has essentially 
emerged out of the CRA.” Phil Gramm, Deregulation and the Financial Panic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 
2009, at A17. 
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 As former Senator Phil Gramm recently opined: “It was not just that CRA and federal housing 
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cover.” Id.  
 
31
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 United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 196 (D. Mass. 1998) (de-
scribing increased costs of subprime loans). 
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 See generally United Companies Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 192. 
 
34
 See FDIC v. Bakkebo, 506 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing this process). For a description 
of an ABCP program, see NationsBank, N.A. v. Commercial Financial Services, 268 B.R. 579 (N.D. 
Okla. 2001).  
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loans and moving the pooled loans off the bank’s balance sheet.  The SPE 
arrangement created a funding mechanism into which hundreds of billions 
of CRA and other subprime mortgages were eventually dumped.35  Perhaps 
not ironically, Bear Stearns made the first CRA securitized offering in 1997, 
and Freddie Mac guaranteed it.36  
Before investors would invest in these CDOs, they had to be assured 
that the investment was sound.  As already noted, a subprime loan is by 
definition inherently risky.  Financial engineers responded to that concern 
by providing differing payment streams from the SPE. The lower tranches 
in those payment schemes were required to absorb losses from defaults 
from non-government guaranteed subprime loans before the upper tranches 
could experience losses. Additional credit protection could be gained from 
credit default swaps (“CDSs”)37 or credit insurance from the so-called 
monoline insurance companies.38  
Those protections convinced the rating agencies, which modeled for 
defaults, to give the upper tranches (commonly called “super seniors”) of 
the CDOs a Triple-A rating, the gold standard for creditworthiness.39  That 
AAA rating made these super seniors highly marketable, and they were sold 
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 Vincent M. Di Lorenzo, Equal Economic Opportunity: Corporate Social Responsibility in the 
New Millennium, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (2000) (describing the growth of CRA securitizations). 
“Warehouse” loans were also made by the investment banks to non-bank subprime originators in order 
to fund the loan to the homeowner. As one source noted: 
 
In 2002, five of the seven largest subprime originators in the land were nonbanks (Ameriquest, 
Household Finance, New Century, Option One and Homecomings), which meant they needed to 
borrow large sums of money to originate loans either through their branches or independent loan 
brokers. A warehouse line was a big loan—nothing more, nothing less—but without it there was 
no fuel to fire the origination machine that the subprime industry would turn into. 
 
PAUL MUOLO & MATHEW PADILLA: CHAIN OF BLAME, HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE 
AND CREDIT CRISIS 183-184 (2008) [hereinafter MUOLO & PADILLA]. 
 
36
 Russell Roberts, How Government Stoked the Mania, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008, at A21; Edito-
rial, The Subprime Lending Bias, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 22, 2008 at A14. 
 
37
 A credit default swap has been defined as: 
 
a common type of credit derivative in which the protection buyer makes a fixed payment to the 
protection seller in return for a payment that is contingent upon a “credit event” —such as a bank-
ruptcy—occurring to the company that issued the security (the “reference entity”) or the security 
itself (the “reference obligation”).  The contingent payment is often made against delivery of a 
“deliverable obligation” —usually the reference obligation or other security issued by the refer-
ence entity—by the protection buyer to the protection seller.  This delivery is known as the “physi-
cal settlement.”  
 




 The monoline insurance companies initially provide credit guarantees for municipal bonds, but 
extended its guarantee business to mortgage backed securities, including subprime pools. Investopedia, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monolineinsurance.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).   
 
39
 For a description of super seniors and their attractions, see UBS AG, Shareholder Report on 
UBS’s Write-Downs §4.2.3 (2008).  
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to investors and financial institutions all over the world. They were particu-
larly popular with European banks.40  The lower tranches were sold to in-
vestors who either accepted their exposure or hedged them with CDSs.  
The subprime market was expanded massively through the securitiza-
tion of subprime loans.  Indeed, most subprime loans were securitized after 
their origination.41  This left the investors in the CDOs holding the bag in 
the event of a default.  A critical side effect to that transfer of risk was that 
loan originators such as mortgage brokers had no incentive to assure that 
the mortgage holder’s already risky credit status was properly vetted.  
Rather, mortgage brokers were paid a “yield spread premium” that gave 
them an incentive to originate no matter how shaky the credit of the bor-
rower.
42
    
IV.  SUBPRIME DANGERS 
The investment banks initially just made warehouse loans to subprime 
lenders in order to fund their originations and bought those originations for 
securitizations.  The investment banks then began purchasing the subprime 
mortgage originators themselves, with disastrous results for Merrill Lynch, 
Citigroup, Wachovia, and others.43  This should come as no surprise.  There 
had been an earlier subprime crisis in 1998-1999 during which large losses 
were experienced.  That crisis resulted in the failure of several large sub-
prime lenders that had become public companies.44  Their failure was 
blamed on increased competition that resulted in a decline in credit quality, 
which is exactly what happened in the present crisis.45  A large commercial 
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 As one article noted: 
The CDO structure depended on the concept of layered risk.  The securities in the “super senior” 
top tier were considered low risk and attracted the highest ratings.  In return for their safety, these 
bonds paid the lowest interest rate.  The reverse was true at the other end; the lower tiers absorbed 
the first losses in the case of loan defaults.  For accepting extra risk, investors in these tiers earned 
a higher interest rate. 
 
Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades And Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2008, at AO1. 
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 By 2008, some $1.5 trillion of subprime and Alt-A mortgages had been securitized. Gretchen 
Morgenson, Everyone Out of the Security Pool, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at BU1. 
 
42
 Bob Tedeschi, Report Piles Blame on Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at RE10. 
 
43
 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 35, at 183-84. 
 
44
 Id. at 44-45, 239. 
 
45
 As one report noted: 
A number of factors have contributed to the recent decline in the health of the subprime industry. 
Increased competition is one of the most important factors.  In 1994, there were only ten compa-
nies in the subprime lending business.  By March of 1998, that figure had grown to fifty.  In-
creased competition in the subprime market caused deterioration in overall credit quality.  The pro-
liferation of subprime lenders forced companies to go deeper into the credit pool to find customers.  
This reduction in credit quality has increased the risk of default. Moreover, consumer defaults have 
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bank was also badly burned by that first subprime crisis.  Before its merger 
with Wachovia, First Union purchased the Money Store for $2.1 billion. 
However, First Union had to take a write down of $1.8 billion on that busi-
ness after the subprime market had its first crash.46  
Inexplicably, investment banks ignored that warning when they en-
tered the subprime market in the new century. As Robert Rubin, the former 
Secretary of the Treasury and senior executive at Citigroup, noted in his 
autobiography (before the subprime crisis into which he had helped lead 
Citigroup) there is a tendency in human nature to engage in “financial ex-
cess” and that humans have a “remarkable failure to draw lessons from past 
experience. . . . The proclivity to go to excess is a phenomenon of collective 
psychology that seems to repeat itself again and again.”47 That warning 
proved to be prophetic for Citigroup and other investment bankers in their 
rush for the yields available from the high paying subprime pools, which 
had now been legitimatized by the federal government.  
In 2003, investment bankers purchased and issued over $230 billion in 
subprime securitizations, almost double that of the prior year.48 At first, the 
investment bankers were well rewarded for this effort.49 They were happily 
reporting large profits in 2004 and 2005 from subprime lending and pro-
prietary trading activities.50 Their executives were given huge bonuses, but 
then the market turned.51 
V.  THE CRISIS 
There was danger here that was real and apparent. Subprime loans 
were often funded by the lender at short-term rates and then loaned to the 
subprime borrower at higher long-term rates.  This allowed a profit from 
                                                    
been on the rise as the average American has taken on an increasing amount of debt.  The industry 
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the spread between the two, i.e. long term interest rates are normally higher 
than short-term rates.  As long as yield spreads are constant, that spread 
creates a steady stream of profits from the CDOs created to fund subprime 
mortgages.  However, that advantage becomes a liability when short-term 
interest rates rise faster than long term rates, cutting that profit margin.52  
That is exactly what happened when the Federal Reserve Board raised 
short-term interest rates, with seventeen straight increases between June 
2004 and June 2006.53  
Those interest rate increases had a twofold effect. CDOs funded with 
short-term paper were no longer profitable and refunding became a problem 
with the arrival of the credit crunch in 2007.  Those rate increases also 
placed pressure on subprime borrowers because many of those loans were 
offered at “teaser” rates that would be reset at much higher rates than sub-
prime lenders would be unable to afford.54  In the rising market accompany-
ing the real estate bubble, borrowers had been able to refinance their homes, 
pulling additional equity of the homes that allow them to service their debt 
and buy other, often unneeded, items. They lost that ability as housing 
prices declined when the bubble broke.  
Subprime borrowers then became delinquent on their loans in increas-
ingly large numbers and many of those delinquent loans went into foreclo-
sure.  By December 2008, about 4.5 percent of all first lien mortgages were 
90 days or more delinquent or in foreclosure. One in ten Alt-A mortgages 
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were delinquent and more than 20 percent of subprime mortgages were 
delinquent or in foreclosure. The number of foreclosures in 2008 reached 
nearly 2.25 million, up from an annual rate of only about one million per 
year before the subprime crisis.55  In Lee County, Florida, judges were au-
thorizing 1,000 foreclosures per day.56 
The effects of the Federal interest rate increases were devastating to 
the large investment banks.  The thirty years following the first Bear 
Stearns offering of securitized subprime loans would destroy that venerable 
firm and push Wall Street into the subprime crisis.57  Merrill Lynch then had 
to be rescued by Bank of America, which then had to be rescued by the 
government as losses at Merrill Lynch continued to grow.58  The banking 
giant Wachovia was brought down by losses from a subprime lender Wa-
chovia had bought to gain market share in such lending.59 Wachovia had to 
be rescued by Wells Fargo.60 Washington Mutual failed and was rescued by 
JPMorgan Chase.61  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in conserva-
torship.62  European banks, including UBS AG suffered massive losses.  
The Royal Bank of Scotland had to be nationalized.63  
In a market test of systemic risk, the government allowed Lehman 
Brothers to fail, which touched off a frightful panic in the credit markets 
and on the stock exchanges.64  A horrifying run began on the money market 
funds, after the Reserve Primary Fund announced that it would “break-the-
buck” because of losses from exposures to Lehman Brothers debt.  That 
panic was quelled only after the government announced it would be guaran-
teeing money market funds.65  
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In total, large investment banks wrote down over $150 billion in sub-
prime mortgages by March 2008, and that amount was expected to double.66  
The stock values of most large financial institutions were smashed.67  The 
last two large independent investment banking firms, Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs, converted to bank-holding companies in order to qualify 
for government bailouts.68  Citigroup also sustained massive loses from 
subprime structured investment vehicles (“Sivs” or more appropriately 
“SIEVs”) and was saved only by a massive federal rescue package.  That 
giant financial supermarket, which had become a market model, is being 
split up into more traditional lines.69  The contagion spread to the American 
International Group, which had to be bailed out by the federal government 
with a $170 billion rescue package.70  
Credit markets were frozen and liquidity became absent.  The federal 
government mounted a momentous effort to deal with this crisis.  Over a 
period of several months, interest rates were slashed down to near zero, 
unprecedented in U.S. history.71  Credit lending facilities were made avail-
able to financial service firms that were non-prime dealers, and later those 
facilities were extended to commercial firms when the commercial paper 
markets froze after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  A facility was also 
created to purchase asset-backed commercial paper from money market 
mutual funds.72  After an initial rejection,73 the Targeted Asset Relief Pro-
gram (“TARP”), the $700 billion bailout program for financial service 
firms, was passed by Congress to inject capital into those struggling institu-
tions.74  FDIC insurance was increased to $250,000, and an FDIC guarantee 
was extended to debt issuance by financial service firms.75 This, of course, 
created an increased, moral hazard.  
In the meantime, the economy fell into recession.  Unemployment 
rates were up, while sales and manufacturing were trending sharply down-
ward.  The housing market was in a near historic slump as new housing 
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starts dwindled to a fifty-year low76 and existing home sales dropped.77  This 
had a ripple effect throughout the economy as construction workers were 
laid off, real estate agents idled, mortgage brokers closed, and other direct 
and indirect participants in the real estate market were sidelined.78 The 
automakers were also in extremis as automobile sales plunged. Chrysler 
and General Motors were saved from bankruptcy, at least temporarily, by a 
cash infusion from the federal government in the waning days of the Bush 
administration.79  
VI.  SELL SIDE REFORMS—TREASURY BLUEPRINT 
The subprime crisis has given rise to a cry for more regulation, what-
ever its form and whatever its efficacy. Fortunately, there is all ready on the 
table a proposal by the Treasury Department for a comprehensive reform of 
U.S. financial services regulation that reflects common sense, rather than 
hysteria.80 That proposal was a result of a study conducted by Treasury in 
response to concerns over the existing financial regulatory system.81 Ironi-
cally, those concerns were focusing on the effects of too much regulation, 
particularly the Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Act of 2002.82  
As a part of its study, the Department sought public comment on a 
number of issues concerning the existing financial regulatory structure. Of 
particular interest was the Department’s request for comment on whether 
the “increasing convergence of products across the traditional ‘functional’ 
regulatory lines of banking, insurance, securities, and futures” justifies 
changes in the regulatory system to assure that regulatory boundary lines do 
not unnecessarily inhibit competition.83 The Department received over 350 
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comment letters on this topic.84 This was obviously a subject that the finan-
cial community thought was important. 
The Treasury Department then published its “Blueprint” for financial 
services regulatory reform that recommended a broad restructuring of this 
chaotic financial services regulatory structure.85 Not surprisingly, the Blue-
print expressed concern that functional regulation was ineffective and was 
undermining America’s traditional competitive advantage in financial ser-
vices.86 The Blueprint prophetically asserted that functional regulation “ex-
hibit[ed] several inadequacies, the most significant being the fact that no 
single regulator possesses all of the information and authority necessary to 
monitor systemic risk, or the potential that events associated with financial 
institutions may trigger broad dislocation or a series of defaults that affect 
the financial system so significantly that the real economy is adversely af-
fected.”87 
The Blueprint contrasted the functional regulatory approach in Amer-
ica with regulatory mechanisms abroad. England Germany, Japan and doz-
ens of other countries use a consolidated regulator, along with a central 
bank, to impose regulation through a single rulebook approach.88 Those 
countries also eschew the “rules-based” approach used by most of the mul-
titude of regulators in the United States. Rather, those overseas regulators 
use a “principles” based approach that generally prescribes the goals of 
regulation and allows the industry to choose how to reach those goals.89  
Interestingly, the Treasury Blueprint declined to adopt a single regula-
tor approach, probably because of objections by the existing regulators. 
Instead, the Blueprint recommended that the United States adopt a so-called 
“Twin Peaks” approach to regulation that is used in Australia and the Neth-
erlands.90 The Twin Peaks approach is objectives-based and focuses on spe-
cific regulatory goals. The concept of twin peaks envisions some regulatory 
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consolidation, particularly through the creation of bodies that would focus 
on prudential supervision, market stability and a single business practices 
regulator that would govern business conduct and consumer protection.  
The Treasury Blueprint also sought to expand federal charters to most 
large financial institutions including insurance companies that, heretofore, 
have escaped federal regulation. The optional federal charter for insurance 
companies would remove insurance electing such a charter to escape the 
scrutiny of 50 state insurance regulators. Under the Treasury Blueprint, a 
federal Office of National Insurance would oversee the federally chartered 
insurance companies.91   
The regulatory structure proposed by the Blueprint would preempt 
most other state regulation of financial institutions. However, this would cut 
off the career paths of many budding state politicians who witnessed the 
rise of Eliot Spitzer to become a national figure as a result of his attacks on 
Wall Street. Spitzer’s successor, Andrew Cuomo, is now the most recent 
and prominent of these wannabes. Naturally, the states were not about to 
take this recommendation lying down. The North America Securities Ad-
ministrators Association (“NASAA”) announced its own plan for reform on 
November 19, 2008 that recommended the preservation of state and federal 
regulation, but admitted that some streamlining might be in order. NASAA 
advocated, however, that all financial products and markets be subject to 
regulation so that there would be no regulatory gaps. It was in favor of 
principles based regulation, but only as an additional layer to existing rules. 
It also wanted to toughen enforcement and strengthen private remedies.92  
The Treasury Blueprint faced other obstacles. It was issued just before 
the subprime crisis was in full bloom, so it did not fully address the prob-
lems in that market. The Blueprint did recommend that mortgage brokers be 
regulated93 and that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac be restructured, a recom-
mendation that came before their failure.94 There were other players that 
attracted regulatory interest outside the Blueprint as the subprime crisis 
exploded. These included the non-bank lenders that built the subprime mar-
ket in the 1990s, many of which failed on their own95, such as the Country-
wide Financial Group that had to be rescued by Bank of America,96 and 
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many others which were acquired by and caused the failure of the large 
investment banks.97  
VII.  REGULATION IN A TIME OF HYSTERIA 
Unfortunately, the careful analytical approach taken by the Treasury 
Blueprint is being abandoned. The present climate of political hysteria sug-
gests that more regulation will simply be heaped onto the existing structure 
without regard to its cost or efficacy. But just adding more regulation for 
regulation sake or to punish failed business executives is not a solution. 
Such regulatory efforts solve no problems and will only make recovery 
more difficult. Focus should, instead, be on the causes of the problems that 
led to the subprime crisis and how best to deal with those issues.  
To be sure, there is plenty of blame to go around. To name a few: there 
is the Congress and the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush 
that pushed the banks and GSEs into the subprime market; regulators of 
every stripe who failed to anticipate the collapse of the subprime market; 
mortgage lenders who abandoned many of the most basic credit assessment 
guidelines; mortgage brokers that originated subprime mortgages for fees 
regardless of the creditworthiness of the borrower; rating agencies that un-
der estimated the risks of subprime securitizations; appraisers that inflated 
their reports; 98 and the under-capitalized monoline insurers that failed to 
recognize the risks from subprime lending.99  
Those actors may be in need of scrutiny to define the reasons behind 
their failures so that more caution can be exercised in the future. But more 
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regulation simply because of a failure of business judgment provides no 
panacea. Regulation has never prevented failure before, why should we 
expect that it would do so in the future? Indeed, the investment banks that 
failed were among the most heavily regulated institutions in the world, but 
regulation did not prevent their failure. Another good example of the fallacy 
of adding more regulation without consideration of its efficacy is the rating 
agencies that were subject to regulation by the SEC after they continued to 
give high ratings to Enron, WorldCom and others until just before their col-
lapse.100 Even now more regulation is being heaped on the rating agencies 
by the SEC as the result of their modeling errors in granting Triple-A rat-
ings to thousands of subprime instruments that had to be subsequently 
downgraded to junk bond status.101 Undoubtedly, that regulation will have 
no effect on the prevention or prediction of future crises.  
Instead of adding more regulation for regulation’s sake, focus is 
needed on the failures that actually led to the crisis. The problems that lie at 
the heart of the subprime crisis are, first and foremost, federal housing pol-
icy that forced banks to make loans on the basis of social policy, rather than 
the credit worthiness of the borrower. To the extent the government wishes 
to encourage homeownership for the poor that should have been done by 
direct subsidies, not through coercive lending policies imposed on private 
sector banks. Banks should return to extending credit based solely on the 
ability of the borrower to service the debt.  
Another culprit in the subprime crisis is the accounting requirement 
for “fair value” treatment of subprime and other tradable assets. Under “fair 
value” accounting requirements those securities had to be valued at existing 
price levels. However, the subprime market was frozen and the only avail-
able prices were at distressed fire sale prices.102 The fair value accounting 
requirement required banks to value their subprime exposures at those dis-
tress prices even though they might not reflect the actual value of the in-
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strument on a long term basis. This requirement resulted in massive write 
downs of subprime assets on the books of financial service firms.103 The 
effect of those write downs was to cause the investment banks to report 
massive losses that completely undercut their share prices and destroyed 
their credibility in the market. Under such circumstances, cash flow, his-
torical cost or other recognized valuation methods should be used instead of 
artificial values derived from a market dislocation caused by a panic. Un-
fortunately, such reform is unlikely as the SEC and other government bod-
ies continue to defend fair value accounting, blaming the failures of banks 
and investment banks on other problems, calling it a “run on the bank.”104 It 
is not as if we learn from past events: 
What many people do not realize is that mark-to-market accounting 
existed in the Great Depression and, according to Milton Friedman, 
was an important reason behind many bank failures. In 1938, Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt called on a commission to study the problem and 
the rule was finally suspended.105 
Another flaw that must be addressed is really the key to the whole 
subprime disaster. Mathematical models used by the underwriters of sub-
prime securitizations, the monoline insurers, the rating agencies and the 
investment banks all failed. Risk modeling took on new importance in fi-
nancial markets with the creation of the Black-Scholes options pricing 
model in 1973.106 This pricing formula gave rise to a widespread belief that 
the risks from complex financial instruments could be scientifically pre-
dicted with some degree of certainty. For example, a risk model developed 
by David Li, a “Gaussian Copula” model, did for collateralized debt obliga-
tions (“CDOs) what Black-Scholes did for options, it was thought to have 
allowed CDOs to be valued through mathematical formulas.107 In wide-
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spread use were the value at risk (“VAR”) models that financial institutions 
used to assess the risk from their portfolios and proprietary trading.108 Those 
models even became the basis for capital requirements in Basel II for banks 
worldwide.109 However, those VAR models failed to predict the massive 
losses sustained by commercial banks in the United States and Europe from 
subprime exposures.  
The use of VAR models for setting capital requirements was extended 
by the SEC in recent years to the large investment banks that it regulated 
through the concept of “consolidated supervised entity” treatment.110 The 
failures of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and problems at 
Morgan Stanley were blamed on the adoption of the consolidated super-
vised unity status for those firms.111 “Under the traditional [SEC net capital 
rule] rule, broker-dealers could not exceed a 12-1 [leverage] ratio, but when 
Bear Stearns became insolvent, its debt-to-capital ratio was 33-to-1; at the 
time of its merger agreement, Merrill's was reportedly 40-to-1.”112 
All of these models failed during the subprime crisis. In retrospect, the 
reason for this is quite clear. Those models relied on historical prices gener-
ated by a rising market that overlooked the perfect storm that became the 
subprime crisis. They made no allowance for the hundred-year storm, the 
“black swan,” the “fat tail” outliers that occurred during the subprime cri-
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sis.113 However, as we have now learned, once again, a hurricane Katrina 
will strike on occasion. Risk models must account for this possibility. 
Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO at Goldman Sachs, published an op-ed 
piece in the Financial Times in which he identified what he believed were 
the flaws in the financial system that had led to the subprime crisis. They 
are worthy of attention. He points risk management failures as the problem, 
such as over reliance on risk modeling that did not take into account “mul-
tiple standard deviation of events.”114 Risk managers also erroneously as-
sumed positions could be fully hedged, and they failed to account for off-
balance-sheet risks. Blankfein further thought that the investment banks had 
not been able to keep up operationally with the complexity of the risks pre-
sented by new financial instruments.115  
Blankfein was right to have targeted these practices. The risks from 
subprime mortgages were simply passed in a circle in many instances or 
dumped on a party that did not have the capital to absorb the loss. If these 
risks had been properly modeled, counterparty assessment would have been 
more thorough, and many subprime mortgages would never have been 
originated because no buyer would accept them. 
VIII.  BUY SIDE REFORMS—MORTGAGE REFORMATIONS 
Most attention during the Bush administration was focused on the sell 
side of the mortgage market during the subprime crisis, which essentially 
meant bailing out the financial institutions that were so badly damaged by 
their participation in that market. Many critics contended that more focus 
should have been placed on aiding homeowners who were losing their 
homes by the thousands as foreclosures mounted.  
On July 30, 2008, President Bush signed into law the HOPE for 
Homeowners Act116 that allowed the Federal Housing Authority (“FHA”) to 
insure up to $300 billion in new refinanced mortgages for poor and dis-
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tressed borrowers.117 It was initially estimated that this would allow some 
400,000 homeowners to refinance their mortgages on more favorable terms 
by converting them into government guaranteed mortgages.118 However, the 
institutions underwriting the original loans would have to forgive some of 
the principal because the refinanced mortgages could not have more than a 
90 percent loan to value ratio.119 This would require the lender to reduce the 
amount of the mortgage to that level. Since housing prices were falling rap-
idly that could be a significant write off.  Another problem was that many 
of the mortgages otherwise qualifying for the program had been securitized. 
In order to adjust the terms of the underlying mortgages in those securitized 
pools, at least in some instances, approval of the investors purchasing the 
instruments would be required. Only 357 individuals signed up for this vol-
untary program and only a handful of mortgage holders had received any 
relief under the program by February 2009.120 The Department of Housing 
and Urban Development blamed this little amount of applications on high 
fees and restricted eligibility requirements.121 As a result only a handful of 
mortgages were refinanced under this program. 
The Bush Administration announced the creation of a program called 
Hope Now in October 2007. This was an alliance between the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, mortgage lenders and loan counselors 
that was intended to provide voluntary assistance and counseling to home-
owners in trouble with their mortgage. Within a few months, some 4,500 
persons were calling the Hope Now hot line each day, but were receiving 
little assistance in dealing with their mortgage paayments.122 
In December 2007, at the request of Henry Paulson, Secretary of the 
Treasury Department, several large mortgage lenders agreed to create new 
programs that would allow potentially defaulting subprime borrowers to 
refinance their mortgages on more affordable terms or to freeze their float-
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ing interest rates for a period of five years.123 Paulson also asked mortgage 
lenders to ease loan terms for borrowers above the subprime level. He noted 
that foreclosures were rising even for prime rate mortgages. Although some 
lenders began to restructure mortgages so that delinquent homeowners 
would not have to default and go into foreclosure, that process was slow to 
get off the ground.124  
It was in the interest of lenders in many instances to make such ad-
justments because declining housing prices would result, in any event, in a 
“short” sale that would return less than the amount covered by the mort-
gage. As a consequence of the continuing decline in the housing market, the 
number of mortgage adjustments increased. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. an-
nounced at the end of 2008 that it would began a program of modifying 
mortgages to ease terms for borrowers. It expanded that program in January 
2009 to extend to the more than $1 trillion of mortgage loans that it had 
securitized.125 
There was much debate in the Bush administration over whether there 
should be a larger bailout of homeowners who could not meet their mort-
gage payments. Secretary Paulson objected to such relief, while Sheila Bair, 
the head of the FDIC was seeking such a rescue.126 President-elect, Barack 
Obama announced that he was in favor of providing such relief.127 True to 
his word, on February 18, 2009, President Obama announced a $200 billion 
plan to provide relief for mortgage loan modifications for homes that were 
under water through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On the same day 
Freddie Mac completed a $10 billion loan offering, the largest in its history. 
Another $75 billion was to be used by the Obama Adminisration for private 
lender loan modification programs. The plan sought to limit loan payments 
to 31 percent of the borrower’s income. Borrowers would be given a $1,000 
per year “pay for success” fee for meeting mortgage payments after modifi-
cation.128 
There is some precedent for greater government intervention in re-
structuring mortgages contracts. The farming crisis that occurred during the 
Great Depression in the 1930s included a massive number of foreclosures 
on farms and caused much unrest and protests. Congress passed the Frazier-
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Lemke Act in 1934129 in an effort to alleviate some of that suffering. This 
legislation required appraisals of foreclosed farms in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The farmer could then seek to have the mortgage holder sell the prop-
erty at its appraised value under a new six-year mortgage with annual pay-
ments set at 2.5 percent of the principal for the first five years, after which 
payments doubled to 5 percent. Annual interest at a rate of 1 percent was 
required to be paid on all unpaid balances. If the mortgage holder refused 
such an arrangement, the bankruptcy court was required to stay all proceed-
ings for five years with the farmer retaining possession of the farm during 
that period, providing that he paid a reasonable rent. However, the Supreme 
Court held that that legislation was unconstitutional.130  
The residential mortgage market was also in crisis during the Great 
Depression. In an effort to rejuvenate that market, the Home Owners Loan 
Act of 1933 created the Home Owner’s Loan Corp. (HOLC),131 which was 
overseen by members of the FHLB. HOLC was funded by a $200 million 
subscription from the Treasury Department through funds obtained from the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). HOLC was also authorized to 
issue its own bonds that were backed by a government guarantee. Initially, 
that guarantee was only for interest, but not principal payments. However, 
the guarantee was extended to principal payments as well in 1934 in order 
to make those bonds more marketable. The eventual amount of bonds au-
thorized for issuance total $4.75 billion.132 
HOLC was authorized to exchange its bonds for residential mortgages 
in an amount not to exceed 80 percent of the value of the property. If the 
lender did not want to accept the bonds, HOLC was authorized to pay cash 
for up to 40 percent of the value of the property. Single-family residences 
eligible for this mortgage relief could not be valued at more than $17,500. 
HOLC was also authorized to advance funds to homeowners who had al-
ready lost their homes in foreclosure proceedings so that they might be re-
covered. Purchases of defaulted mortgages injected new funds into the 
S&Ls, providing liquidity and allowing them to make new loans and con-
tinue their business. 133   
HOLC’s mission was to stop the massive foreclosures that were then 
occurring on home mortgages. It was to achieve that goal by replacing de-
faulted or troubled mortgages with new mortgages on terms that the home-
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owners could meet. This was accomplished by purchasing the troubled 
mortgages from banks and then new mortgages were issued to the home-
owners on more lenient terms of 15-year maturities at a 5 percent interest 
rate. HOLC converted the prevalent short-term mortgages into long-term 
loans that were amortized over the life of the mortgage.134 This allowed the 
homeowners to reduce dependence on short-term refinancings and shielded 
them from a requirement that they make a larger balloon payment only a 
few years after taking out the loan. Homeowners were able to remain in 
their homes and build up equity over the years. This loan structure became 
the model for the “conventional” mortgages that exist even today.  
Between 1933 and 1936, HOLC took over more than 1 million home 
loans.135 HOLC eventually purchased about 20 percent of all home mort-
gages during the Great Depression. The total number of loans applied for 
totaled about 1.9 million with a value of $6.1 billion, which was about half 
of the outstanding residential real estate debt. Notwithstanding the leniency 
of the new loans, there was still a 20 percent default rate on the mortgages 
purchased by HOLC. It ended up owning some 200,000 houses, which were 
sold over a period of several years. At one point, HOLC held an inventory 
of over 100,000 homes.136 When HOLC was disbanded in 1951 it returned 
$14 million to the Treasury as surplus.137 Nevertheless, HOLC critics 
charged that the program did more to help lenders than borrowers.138 In fact, 
those efforts actually did little or nothing to restore the mortgage market. 
Rather, that recovery came with World War II, during which a housing 
shortage arose.  
IX.  CONCLUSION  
The nation is at a turning point in its history. Many of our leading fi-
nancial institutions have collapsed or have been effectively nationalized by 
the federal government. There is even concern that some of those financial 
institutions will be socialized.139 This is a most dangerous situation, and 
every effort must be made to liquidate the government’s ownership interest 
in those institutions as rapidly as possible. Equally important is assuring 
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that the restructuring of the financial services regulatory system is done in a 
way that does not unnecessarily impair business or impose unnecessary 
costs. Certainly, there is a need for regulatory reform, and the Treasury 
Blueprint provides a useful model. However, at the end of the day, we must 
recognize that regulation cannot stop business cycles. It can only impair 
recovery. The financial system will rebuild itself and begin another cycle of 
prosperity. Unfortunately, that period of prosperity will inevitably lead to 
another downturn and to another crisis, as has occurred throughout history. 
We should also remember that the New Deal regulatory structure that 
created the federal securities laws and separated the investment banks and 
commercial banks through the Glass-Steagall Act did nothing to restore the 
economy during the Great Depression. To the contrary, it inhibited capital 
investment. It was only the outbreak of war in Europe that saved the econ-
omy, not full disclosure or regulation of bank activities.140 New Deal regula-
tion provided no shelter afterwards. The SEC was incapable of detecting or 
preventing the Enron era scandals, the subprime crisis or even Bernard 
Madoff’s monstrous $50 billion Ponzi scheme.141  
In the present environment, there will be much hysteria that will divert 
attention away from the real causes of the subprime crisis.. Demands are 
already being made for more SEC style “transparency” regulation.142 No 
one seems to know whether or how more transparency will prevent future 
financial crises. The term transparency is simply tossed out in much the 
way the terms “organic” and “sustainable” are being used to sell everything 
from eggs to mattresses. No one seems to really know what those terms 
mean or what benefits they might bestow on our health or the environment 
that might justify their higher costs, but we must have them anyway. What 
the Nation really needs to focus on is the fact that transparency has been 
mandated since 1933 for the financial services firms that failed during the 
subprime crisis. Those firms were also exhaustively regulated by the SEC. 
That transparency and regulation provided no protection from the perfect 
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storm that arose during the subprime crisis and will shield no one from the 
next one.143  
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